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GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS. By .Daniel N. Hoff man. 
Westport: Greenwood Press. 1981. Pp. ix, 339. $35. 
The landmark litigation over governmental secrecy spawned by the Vi-
etnam and Watergate debacles 1 left many questions unresolved. Para-
mount among them is the extent of Congress' power to demand access to 
information held by the executive branch. Former Watergate Special Pros-
ecutor Archibald Cox, characterizing the issue as a "political question," 
doubts the ability of the courts to develop manageable standards for resolv-
ing this issue,2 and suggests that it would be best left "to the ebb and flow of 
political power."3 In opposition to this view, Daniel N. Hoffman's Govern-
mental Secrecy and the Founding Fathers provides powerful ammunition 
for proponents of judicial intervention. The nonjudicial precedents col-
lected in Hoffman's study of the "Federalist period" demonstrate convinc-
ingly the failure of the political process, even at the hands of the Founding 
Fathers themselves, to develop standards for solving interbranch secrecy 
disputes that even remotely resemble rules of law.4 
I. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
2. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 222 (1962). 
3. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REY. 1383, 1424-26 (1974). See also Sofaer, 
Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REY. 281, 292-93 (1974) (reviewing R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRJYJ-
LEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974)). 
4. Hoffman's discussion of executive privilege relies primarily on five incidents which oc-
curred between 1787-1800. In 1792 a House committee investigating the massacre ofan entire 
Army division led by General St. Clair requested documents from Secretary of War Knox. 
Although Secretary of State Jefferson's diary indicates that the Cabinet advised the President 
that he had discretion to refuse to make any disclosure that would be injurious to the public, 
the President acquiesced to the House request. In 1794 the Senate conducted an investigation 
into the conduct of the Ambassador to France, Gouveneur Morris. Washington complied with 
a request that he tum over Morris' official correspondence, but the submission was carefully 
censored. The same year a House co=ittee investigating certain transactions conducted by 
Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton requested proof of presidential authorization. Hamilton 
asserted executive privilege, but eventually complied with the Senate's request. In fact, the 
President himself supplied verification of Hamilton's statements. In 1796, Washington refused 
outright to comply with a House request for papers relating to John Jay's negotiation of a 
treaty with the British. Washington told the House that since the treaty power was vested 
solely in the Executive and the Senate, and impeachment was not under consideration, the 
requested papers did not relate to any matter properly under the House's cognizance. Two 
years later President Adams ignored this "precedent" and complied with the request of opposi- · 
tion House Republicans that he disclose the so-called XYZ papers, which related to treaty 
negotiations with the French. 
Although the "precedents" Hoffman cites have been discussed in the literature on executive 
privilege, Hoffman is the first writer to analyze all five incidents with detailed consideration of 
the political environment in which they occurred. See, e.g., R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVI-
LEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 167-79 (1974); A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVI-
LEGE 29-37 (1974); SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 77-93, 
133- 37 (1976); J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 248-259 (1964); Rogers, Constitutional Law: 
The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A. J. 941, 943-44 (1958). 
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Hoffman's conception of the "rule of law" is fundamental to his argu-
ments. Without rejecting the judicial model of "dispassionate and prece-
dent-biased reflection" (p. 6), he asserts that a political model of the rule of 
law - "one which holds that there is a genius built into the very structure 
of government, which helps to rationalize and balance the flow of decision-
making even though participants may have selfish, conflicting, or irrational 
ends in view" (p. 7) - also plays a legitimate role in our constitutional 
system. In the absence of a judiciary willing and able to act as the final 
arbiter ofinterbranch disputes,5 the degree to which the Founding Fathers 
succeeded in "legalizing" the executive privilege issue must be judged by 
the political model. Hoffman's contribution is the identification of the fac-
tors which made, and continue to make, the problem of executive secrecy 
particularly unsuited for "legalization" by the political process. 
Hoffman finds that lack of constitutional guidance was not such a fac-
tor. Indeed, he subtitles his book "A Study in Constitutional Controls," 
and begins with the Constitutional Convention of 1787. There the framers 
conceived that effective government required a single, strong executive able 
to act with speed and secrecy when the situation required it. They were 
determined, however, that the executive branch should be accountable for 
its actions. How were these competing goals to be reconciled? Hoffman 
responds, ''The answer lay in the president's relationship with Congress -
in the crucial device of separation of powers" (p. 31 ). 
The Founding Fathers, by Hoffman's account, assumed that the sharing 
of power by coequal branches would also entail the sharing of informa-
tion. 6 The Constitution as thus framed, he argues, "subjected governmental 
secrecy to the rule oflaw in a subtle, partial, but meaningful sense" (pp. 40-
41) by providing "norms and processes" (p. 41) under which interbranch 
communication rules could be developed. Yet Hoffman finds that these 
rules never developed in fact. He notes that the actual practices 
emerged neither from a process of careful, collective deliberation about the 
costs and benefits for the nation of adopting one rule or another, nor from 
a sensible, stable compromise between the institutional claims of the sev-
eral governmental bodies, but from a series of piecemeal decisions, each of 
which was strongly affected if not entirely dominated by the short-run par-
tisan and policy concerns of those participating. [P. 9.) 
Hoffman does not attribute the failure to achieve "a rational and bal-
anced communication system" (p. 196) to any lack of commitment to con-
stitutional ideals. "After all, the Founding Fathers invested a very 
substantial effort in constitutional analysis and debate. Many of their ef-
forts were impressive in quality and were designed not for public effect but 
for decision-makers' consumption" (p. 230). Rather, Hoffman argues that a 
protracted state of emergency in foreign affairs and sharp political division 
5. The courts' ability to so intervene was not established until after the period of Hoffman's 
study. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Their willingness remains an 
open question. 
6. Presumably the president must share information on such executive matters as treaties 
and appointments in order to obtain the "advice and consent" of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art 
II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution also requires the President "from time to time [to] give the 
Congress Information of the State of the Union" to aid it in its legislative functions. U.S. 
CONST. art II, § 3. 
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at home combined to produce a "situation inauspicious for the develop-
ment of stable secrecy /publicity norms" (p. 227). Foreign crises gave the 
executive almost carte b!anche to act with secrecy and dispatch, and divi-
sion within Congress made it impossible for the institution as a whole to 
defend its prerogatives: "Administration supporters usually were loath to 
assert congressional prerogative to the detriment of party interests, and 
even the opposition party often behaved as if it would rather capture the 
presidency than weaken it" (p. 225). 
However "inauspicious" these circumstances were for principled discus-
sion of executive secrecy, Hoffman argues that it is precisely the confluence 
of internal unrest and foreign crisis that elevates secrecy to the forefront of 
debate. Citing the Vietnam era as the only other period in which these 
factors were simultaneously present, he concludes that the political process 
fails to provide a rule that strikes the proper balance when it is most neces-
sary (pp. 257-60). 
So long as interbranch communication is regulated by the political pro-
cess, Hoffman sees Congress suffering a more or less steady erosion of its 
constitutional powers. Though he considers the War Powers Act of 1973 
and the Freedom of Information Act of 1974 healthy developments, he 
fears they will not survive as the presidency regains its "imperial momen-
tum" (p. 260). The effectiveness of Hoffman's suggestion for correcting the 
historical imbalance, "an office of legal counsel to the Congress, endowed 
with plenary subpoena power and standing to sue in court" (p. 260), de-
pends upon the willingness of the judiciary to intervene in "the ebb and 
flow of political power."7 
True to its title, Hoffman's study encompasses more than the early asser-
tions of executive privilege before Congress. Other governmental secrecy 
problems discussed include the establishment of internal regulations by the 
executive branch and the two houses of' Congress. While these develop-
ments help to illustrate the Founders' reliance on "institutional pluralism" 
for reconciling the goals of effective and accountable government (p. 19), 
contemporary constitutional lawyers will be most interested in what hap-
pened in that "zone of twilight"8 where institutional prerogatives overlap. 
Hoffman acknowledges that "[c]ommunications from the executive to Con-
gress were the key focus of secrecy conflict in the Federalist period" (p. 
234), and his conclusions primarily address this aspect of the secrecy 
problem. 
James Russell Wiggins once cited the legal debate over congressional 
access to executive papers as an example of the unreliability of "Lawyers as 
7. The controversy concerning the House of Representatives contempt proceedings against 
former Environmental Protection Agency administrator Anne M. [Gorsuch] Burford, for re-
fusing to supply subpoenaed documents, illustrates some of the difficulties of judicial interven-
tion. Rather than prosecute, the Justice Department filed a civil suit against the House 
challenging the constitutionality of the subpoena. The House contested the Justice Depart-
ment's use of the "United States" designation in the caption. See Gorsuch Contempt Case 
Evokes a Counterpunch, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1982, at 6, col. 5. Ultimately the EPA and 
House investigators reached an out-of-court settlement. See Accord is Reached For House Ac-
cess to Files of E.P.A., N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 6. 
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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Judges of History."9 Though it does not offer a resolution of the legal is-
sues involved, Hoffman's thoughtful and unusually readable book should 
provide fuel for future debate. 
9. J. WIGGINS, supra note 4, at 245-69. 
